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Duhemian good sense and agent reliabilism 
 
1. Background and Introduction 
Famously, according to Pierre Duhem a hypothesis can never be experimentally tested in 
isolation, but only along with the entire theoretical scaffolding it comes with. So in the face of 
disagreement between theory and experiment, it is impossible to point out which hypotheses in 
the theory are flawed. A big question for Duhem was, how does the physicist act in such a 
situation of underdetermination? Which hypotheses does she discard, and which one(s) does she 
retain? Duhem’s response was that the physicist possesses a partly intuitive, partly cultivated, 
“good sense” that directs this choice. For him, although good sense does not provide a rigorous, 
rule-based template for theory choice1, it allows scientists to weigh evidence and be “fair and 
impartial” (1954, 218). 
Recently, there has been much interest in drawing parallels between Duhem’s good sense 
and ideas in virtue epistemology (VE). VE emerged in the 1980s as an approach to epistemology 
analogous to virtue ethics. In the words of John Greco and John Turri (2016): “Virtue ethics 
explains an action's moral properties in terms of the agent's properties, for instance whether it 
                                                
1 While “theory choice” today is generally understood in the context of contrastive 
underdetermination, Duhem was primarily concerned with the holist variety of 
underdetermination and advanced good sense in the context of the latter. But for the purposes of 
this paper the distinction will not matter (with the exception of one small discussion in Section 4 
where I shall clarify the distinction), and I shall use “theory choice” to refer to 
underdetermination in general, as do all the authors I reference. 
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results from kindness or spite. VE explains a cognitive performance's normative properties in 
terms of the cognizer's properties, for instance whether a belief results from hastiness or 
excellent eyesight, or whether an inquiry manifests carelessness or discrimination. For virtue 
ethics the relevant properties are moral virtues and vices, and for VE intellectual virtues and 
vices.” A virtue epistemological reading of good sense as first advanced by David Stump (2007) 
is based on the idea that Duhem too emphasized the normative properties of the scientist qua 
cognitive agent and took them as a basis for legitimate scientific knowledge in the face of 
underdetermination of theory by evidence. Stump finds striking similarities particularly between 
Duhemian good sense and Linda Zagzebski’s views of VE. Milena Ivanova (2010) and Abrol 
Fairweather (2011) have proposed interesting critical responses to Stump’s view. Here, I discuss 
the views of Stump, Ivanova, and Fairweather in this regard and ultimately propose my own 
view in response, which is an agent-reliabilist reading of Duhem’s good sense. 
In Section 2 I give overviews of Stump’s, Ivanova’s, and Fairweather’s views, and briefly 
describe my responses to them. In Section 3 I describe in some detail Greco’s (1999) version of 
agent reliabilism. In Section 4 I show how Duhem nicely fits this picture of agent reliabilism, 
and I close with Section 5 where I explore some larger implications of viewing Duhemian good 
sense as agent reliabilist, to the Problem of Induction in philosophy of science. 
 
2. Three Tales of Good Sense  
Stump (2007) argues that Duhem conceived of good sense in a way that can today be 
understood as virtue theoretic. In particular, Stump finds similarities between good sense and 
ideas of VE put forward by Zagzebski (1996). As Stump tells us, Zagzebski argued that justified 
belief comes from a “cluster of intellectual virtues in the same way that the rightness of an act 
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can be defined in terms of moral virtue in ethical theory”(Stump, 151). Stump argues that 
Duhem’s good sense nicely fits in with these ideas. Good sense depends on the scientist, the 
cognitive agent, being “virtuous”: she has to be, in the words of Duhem quoting Claude Bernard, 
a “faithful and impartial judge”. Stump further provides another illuminating quote from Duhem 
from his lectures on German science: 
“In the realm of every science, but more particularly in the realm of history, the pursuit of the 
truth not only requires intellectual abilities, but also calls for moral qualities: rectitude, 
probity, detachment from all interest and all passions.” (Duhem quoted in Stump, 152). 
Stump notes that some of the epistemic virtues put forward by Zagzebski include 
intellectual sobriety, impartiality and intellectual courage and the list fits very well with 
Duhem’s. Yet another striking similarity between Zagzebski and Duhem according to Stump is 
that they both appeal to non-rule-governed epistemology. Zagzebski, in making a case for an 
epistemology based on ethics, says, “The idea is that there can be no complete set of rules 
sufficient for giving a determinate answer to the question of what an agent should do in every 
situation of moral choice.” (Stump, 152) Similarly, Duhem arrives at the idea of good sense 
when the rule-based epistemology of the physical method (i.e. strict agreement between theory 
and experiment) fails. As Stump says, 
“Holism threatens to make testing impossible, yet Duhem believes that scientific consensus 
will emerge. While the pure logic of the testing situation leaves theory choice open, good 
sense does not. Duhem claims that the history of science shows that while there is controversy 
in science, there is also closure of scientific debates.” (Stump, 155) 
Ivanova (2010) has argued that Stump is mistaken in drawing such close parallels 
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between VE and Duhem’s good sense. Her central objection2 has to do with epistemic 
justification. According to her whereas VE takes epistemic virtues to be justifications for beliefs, 
Duhem did not invoke the concept of good sense to justify belief in one theory over another. (She 
rightly notes that Duhem did not have a full-blown metaphysical notion of truth of a theory – but 
worked with the surrogate idea of truth, natural classification: a right theory approaches a 
transcendental, natural classification of experimental laws. So justification for belief in a theory 
here means justification for the belief that the said theory is approaching a natural classification, 
not for the belief that it is true.) Rather, she argues, good sense for Duhem was more a post hoc 
explanation of the physicist’s choice: it explains the repeated success of theories at making novel 
predictions. According to Ivanova, what really justified belief in a theory for Duhem – i.e. the 
belief that it was approaching a natural classification – was the success of the theory in making 
correct novel predictions. She says that for Duhem, “[a scientist] is justified in believing that a 
theory is a natural classification only when some empirical evidence supports it or when the 
theory has become a ‘prophet for us’ (Duhem, 27), that is, when it has managed to make novel 
predictions.” (Ivanova, 62). Moreover, according to Ivanova, Duhem doesn’t say much about 
good sense as a method of science: he doesn’t tell us how exactly it directs our choice. His 
account of how good sense comes about and works to direct theory choice is quite thin. For 
Ivanova, this further shows that Duhem did not introduce it as a justification but only as a post 
                                                
2 She raises another objection that the comparison breaks down since VE has to do with getting 
to truth – and considers it attainable – while Duhem isn’t in the truth-business: physical theories 
only approach a ‘natural classification’ of observable phenomena – never actually getting there – 
and don’t reveal any underlying truths about nature. But she responds to this objection herself by 
saying that a) natural classification is still related to truth in that it reveals truths about the 
relations between observable phenomena even if not about unobservable phenomena, and b) one 
could strive towards an epistemic goal even if it isn’t attainable. I’m on board with these 
responses. I would add in response to a) that even if we didn’t look at natural classification as 
related to any kind of truth, we can still draw parallels with VE with respect to the means to 
attaining an epistemic end – be it truth or natural classification – regardless of the end itself. 
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hoc explanation. 
 Fairweather (2011) has advanced a position on Duhemian good sense that is a hybrid of 
Ivanova’s and Stump’s views. Fairweather claims to draw upon an agent reliabilist VE to do this. 
While simple reliabilism as a theory of knowledge has it that knowledge and justification are 
based on reliable cognitive processes, according to agent reliabilism, knowledge and justification 
have their bases in stable and successful dispositions of the cognitive agent. According to 
Fairweather good sense results in a reliable process – and this process for him is the result of 
“skillful exercise of cognitive character” (2011, 143), hence apparently making his reading of 
Duhem agent reliabilist. Since Duhem’s claim is that good sense has a great “track record” and 
always picks out a successful theory – i.e. a theory that inevitably correctly makes a novel 
prediction – good sense produces a theory approaching a natural classification (the equivalent in 
the Duhemian context, of knowledge in regular epistemology) by a reliable process. According 
to Fairweather’s reading of Duhem good sense is a ‘truth-promoting factor’ regardless of 
whether the theory it picks out ultimately succeeds in novel prediction. Fairweather says it is 
“tracking evidentially important features of theories” (2011, 143) He claims that “If a belief P is 
the product of a reliable capacity or process this fact constitutes evidence in favor of P.” (ibid., 
143)  This implies, “If the products of good sense reliably turn out to be supported by compelling 
new evidence, then being the product of good sense will be evidence for any theory with such a 
distinguished etiology.” (ibid., 143) So, Fairweather says, it seems that “future evidence is not 
required to evidentially distinguish the theory chosen by good sense, because the reliability of 
good sense is itself evidence supporting that theory.” (ibid., 143)  
 What epistemic role – if any – does novel predictive success play then? According to 
Fairweather, good sense confers uniqueness to a theory – which, according to him, no future 
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evidence can confer due to underdetermination. That is, good sense picks out one unique theory 
during underdetermination and puts the rest out of the running. But after good sense has uniquely 
picked out a theory, it is a successful novel prediction that counts as evidence in favor of the 
chosen theory. For Fairweather then, this is the conclusion that follows from such a reading of 
good sense:  
“This shows an interesting fact that new evidence in favor of a theory gives it a different 
epistemic standing depending on whether we are considering it alongside or independent of 
meaningful rivals. In the former case, new confirming evidence does not make a theory the 
determinate choice with fundamental epistemic standing. In the latter case, that same evidence 
determines theory choice and confers fundamental epistemic standing.” (Fairweather, 144) 
So there are two “epistemic values and epistemic standings”: uniqueness, which comes from 
good sense, and clinching evidential support from a successful novel prediction. This way, good 
sense alone does not confer “fundamental epistemic standing”, and evidence alone cannot confer 
uniqueness. This account, which recognizes an important epistemic role for both good sense and 
new empirical evidence, Fairweather calls the “hybrid reading”. 
My own view is that Stump is right in reading Duhem as a virtue epistemologist. 
However, within VE, Fairweather is right that agent reliabilism particularly fits Duhem well. (I 
think he is also right in pointing out that Stump’s account is more paradigmatic of responsibilist 
(as opposed to reliabilist) VE which is based on epistemic responsibilities of the agent.) I 
contend that Ivanova makes a category mistake in claiming that good sense is explanatory and 
not justificatory: while Duhem’s thesis of good sense – the thesis that physicists are guided by 
good sense in their theory choice – explains how physicists choose theories in the face of 
underdetermination, according to this thesis, good sense itself is what brings about and justifies 
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the choice. So while explanatoriness applies to the thesis here, providing justification applies to 
the object of that thesis, i.e. good sense. I contend that Duhem was both in the business of 
explanation and justification: while he provided the thesis of good sense to explain theory 
choice, the thesis says that good sense justifies a physicist’s choice of theory – and Duhem took 
this thesis seriously. I will also show how this line has clear parallels with the larger discourse in 
epistemology, on reliabilism as a solution to skepticism.  
Fairweather is right in that agent reliabilism best fits Duhem’s views. But although he 
claims to give an agent reliabilist reading of good sense, I don’t think he goes into this deeply 
enough. While he agrees that “good sense can be seen as the skillful exercise of cognitive 
character” (Faiarweather, 143), he ultimately claims that it is novel predictive success that 
confers “fundamental epistemic standing” on theory choice. I believe this is mistaken. On my 
reading of Duhem, good sense should be considered at least as epistemically fundamental as 
novel predictive success. I will argue that no ‘hybrid reading’ is required: I will argue that agent 
reliabilism – following Greco’s (1999) account of it – fully accommodates Duhem. Moreover, I 
will argue that there is no tension in having both novel predictive success and good sense in the 
larger epistemological picture. The role of novel predictive success in lending epistemic 
legitimacy to a theory does not threaten an agent reliabilist reading of Duhem. Before getting 
into defending these claims, I will now provide an overview of Greco’s agent reliabilism. 
 
3. Greco and Agent Reliabilism 
Greco (1999) explains how some form of reliabilism is necessary to avoid skepticism. Hume 
has shown us that there is no logical relation between our empirical beliefs and their evidence. 
His arguments (from the famed Problem of Induction) show that “if our evidence is indeed a 
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reliable indication of the truth of our empirical beliefs, then this is at most a contingent fact about 
human cognition, rather than a function of any necessary relations, deductive or inductive, 
between evidence and belief.” (Greco, 273) Hence, “any non-skeptical theory of knowledge has 
to be a version of reliabilism.” (ibid., 274) Reliabilism gets us out of the Problem of Induction 
since it grounds justification and knowledge in reliable cognitive sources. In other words, if we 
want to avoid skepticism and knowledge is to be possible, we have to take it that our beliefs stem 
from a reliable cognitive source: a source that reliably generates accurate beliefs. 
Simple reliabilism is the view that a belief is justified just in case it is formed via reliable 
processes. Here the proportion of true beliefs the process results in, over time, measures 
reliability. Greco argues that simple reliabilism is insufficient for two reasons:  
1. An agent might form a belief via fleeting or strange processes: Greco starts by noting that 
“Reliabilism must somehow restrict the kind of reliable process that is able to ground 
knowledge, so as to rule out processes that are strange or fleeting.” (ibid., 286) As an 
example of such processes, Greco discusses Alvin Platinga’s “The case of the 
epistemically serendipitous lesion” where an agent has a rare kind of a brain lesion, one 
that makes her believe that she has a brain lesion. There is no evidence for the lesion: 
there are no symptoms, no testimony etc.; in fact there might even be a lot of evidence 
against it. But the agent is unable to take account of this (lack of) evidence due to the 
lesion. The relevant cognitive process here must no doubt be deemed very reliable, but 
we would not want to take the resulting belief as justified.  
2. Process reliabilism doesn’t guarantee that the agent has a subjective justification of her 
belief. Greco says,  
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“[there] is a powerful intuition that knowledge does require that the knower have some 
kind of sensitivity to the reliability of her evidence. Sometimes this intuition is 
expressed by insisting that knowledge requires subjective justification. It is not enough 
that one's belief is formed in a way that is objectively reliable; one's belief must be 
formed in a way that is subjectively appropriate as well.” (ibid., 285)  
In other words, it should be an epistemological requirement that the epistemic agent not be 
oblivious to the reliability of her evidence. Simple reliabilism is okay with this obliviousness: it 
does not demand sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence and is hence inadequate.  
 Greco’s solution to the above problems is agent reliabilism. According to agent 
reliabilism, reliability is shifted from the belief-forming process to the qualities of the agent’s 
mind: 
“Relevant to present purposes is Sosa's suggestion for a restriction on reliable cognitive 
processes; it is those processes that have their bases in the stable and successful dispositions 
of the believer that are relevant for knowledge and justification. Just as the moral rightness of 
an action can be understood in terms of the stable dispositions or character of the moral agent, 
the epistemic rightness of a belief can be understood in terms of the intellectual character of 
the cognizer.” (ibid., 287) 
Following Ernest Sosa’s views, Greco proposes that “knowledge and justified belief are 
grounded in stable and reliable cognitive character.”(ibid., 287) Accordingly, “We may now 
explicitly revise simple reliabilism as follows: A belief p has positive epistemic status for a 
person S just in case S's believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S's 
cognitive character.” (ibid., 287) Agent reliabilism’s focus is on how true beliefs are come to be 
had: it is through stable dispositions of the epistemic agent. Hence agent reliabilism effectively 
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weeds out the brain lesion type cases: such beliefs are not come to be had by means of stable and 
reliable dispositions. 
 Greco proceeds to show how agent reliabilism also solves the problem of subjective 
justification: 
VJ: “A belief p is subjectively justified for a person S (in the sense relevant for having 
knowledge) if and only if S's believing p is grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S 
manifests when S is thinking conscientiously.” (ibid., 289)  
By “thinking conscientiously”, Greco clarifies that he does not mean thinking with the purpose 
of finding truth, but rather the “usual state that people are in as a kind of a default mode – the 
state of trying to form beliefs accurately.” Greco contrasts this with epistemic “vices” such as 
trying to comfort oneself or trying to seek attention.  
Greco points out that agent reliabilism reverses the “usual direction of analysis between 
virtuous character and justified belief” (ibid., 290). While non virtue theoretic epistemologies 
understand virtues in terms of justified belief, here justified belief is being cached out in terms of 
virtues of the cognizer. “Virtuous belief is associated with the dispositions a person manifests 
when she is sincerely trying to believe what is true”, and “The dispositions that a person 
manifests when she is thinking conscientiously are stable properties of her character, and are 
therefore in an important sense hers.” (ibid., 290) Therefore, a belief formed this way will be 
subjectively appropriate.  
To sum up, in order to avoid skepticism we need some form of reliabilism. Simple 
reliabilism runs into problems as above – hence agent reliabilism is the way to go. 
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4. Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism 
First I want to draw the reader’s attention to Duhem’s characterization of the different 
kinds of minds – in Aim and Structure (1954), but also in detail in German Science (1991). The 
“ample but weak” mind is one that has  
“an extraordinary power to hold in mind an extremely complex collection of objects, provided 
these are sensory objects having shape and color that the imagination can visualize, second, an 
incapacity for abstraction and generalization, even going so far as a deep aversion with regard 
to these intellectual operations.”(1954, 58)  
In contrast, the “supple” mind is the mind with a) the intuitive ‘espirit de finesse’ that produces 
good sense capable of sound judgment in the face of underdetermination; as well as b)‘esprit de 
géométrie’ which helps grasp a wide range of objects and at the same time abstract, generalize, 
and group them logically. The aim of physical theory for Duhem, was building a logically 
coordinated classification of empirical laws, and so both the espirit de finesse and espirit de 
géométrie played important roles. The supple mind can “grasp simultaneously the whole and the 
details”(1954, 61). He says in German Science, that good sense “will intervene at the moment at 
which one realizes that the consequences of a preconceived idea are either contradicted or 
confirmed by the experiment. This realization is in fact far from being entirely simple; the 
confirmation or contradiction is not always explicit and straightforward, like a simple ‘yes’ or 
‘no’.” (23) Further, drawing on the example of Pasteur’s experiments with rabbits which were 
performed to confirm his preconceived idea that on injecting a certain substance in them rabbits 
die; Duhem comments: 
“If, then, he sees one inoculated rabbit live or one control animal die, he need not conclude 
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directly and overtly to the falsity of his preconceived idea. He could be faced with some 
accident of the experiment which need not require the abandonment of his idea. What will 
determine whether these failures are or are not of such a nature that the supposition in question 
must be renounced? Good sense. But this judgment will be of just the same type as a judgment 
in a legal proceeding wherein each of the two parties is faced with evidence some of which 
tends towards conviction and some towards exculpation. Good sense will not return its verdict 
until after having weighed the pros and cons with mature consideration.”(1991, 24) 
Now all this – finesse, judgment, mature consideration – certainly strikes me as talk of  
“stable dispositions” in Greco’s sense of the term, that reflect the cognitive character of the 
scientist. Duhem takes pains to carefully describe the mind of the physicist and discuss beliefs 
and attitudes in terms of cognitive character traits and not the other way round. i.e., Duhem talks 
of legitimacy of beliefs in terms of cognitive character traits; he does not talk of the traits or 
“epistemic virtues” so to speak, in terms of the validity of beliefs. For instance, he says about 
those not interested in seeing a unified and coordinated system of classification of laws erected – 
which he took to be a very important indication of a theory’s approaching natural classification – 
that such minds are the ample and weak ones that “fear” abstraction and generalization. (1954, 
102) He goes on to say that “Those very physicists who have developed theories whose various 
parts cannot be fitted together…. have done so only reluctantly and with regret.” (1954, 102) 
Further: “Only those who affect a hatred of intellectual strength were mistaken to the extent of 
taking the scaffolding for a completed building.” (1954, 103) Such statements clearly show that 
Duhem turns traditional non virtue-theoretic epistemology on its head and makes cognitive 
character traits basic. Another interesting parallel between Greco’s agent reliabilism and Duhem 
is that both hold that virtues/ good sense are part intuitive, and part cultivated. Greco says, 
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“knowledge and justified belief are grounded in stable and reliable cognitive character. Such 
character may include both a person's natural cognitive faculties as well as her acquired habits of 
thought.” (1999, 287). And Duhem notes in both German Science and in Aim and Structure that 
while good sense is born out of the intuitive ‘espirit de finesse’, it nevertheless gets perfected by 
the study of history, by our becoming more aware of the failures and successes of previous 
theories, by thinking about the trajectory of scientific theories. 
Moreover, Duhem’s view that hypotheses “germinate” in a mind that has been made 
conducive (1954, 252-257) reinforces an agent reliabilist reading of him. Duhem firmly believed 
that a physicist should have studied the historical developments of theories. Comparing the birth 
of a hypothesis to the germination of a seed, he says “a preliminary labor has made favorable the 
ground in which the seed fell; it has made possible the accelerated development…” (ibid., 254) 
He says of Oersted’s contributions to electrodynamics for instance, that he was “remarkably well 
prepared to receive it, nourish it, and develop it.” (ibid., 254) Further:  
“Contemplation of a set of experimental laws alone does not, therefore, suffice to suggest to the 
physicist what hypotheses he should choose in order to give a theoretical representation of 
these laws; it is also necessary that the thoughts habitual with those among whom he lives and 
the tendencies impressed on his own mind by his previous studies come and guide him, and 
restrict the excessively great latitude left to his choice by the rules of logic.” (ibid., 255)  
So good sense definitely seems to qualitatively fit the agent reliabilist picture. But the 
central, specific question this paper purports to address is, did good sense justify theory choice? 
As outlined in Section 2, Ivanova claims that good sense for Duhem is just a post hoc 
explanation of theory choice, not a justification for it. I briefly stated my argument against this 
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idea there, and will elaborate on it here. Duhem’s thesis of good sense can be seen as 
explanatory: the thesis can be seen as explaining how a theory or hypothesis reasonably and 
justifiably gets picked out in in the face of empirical uncertainty. The explanation is that good 
sense directs and justifies this choice. However, Duhem seems to have been a realist about this 
explanation. I.e., he took this explanation to be true. This means that according to him, good 
sense really does bring about and justify theory choice – in fact, as suggested in the German 
Science quote above which says good sense “intervenes”; good sense is causal: it is responsible 
for theory choice. Good sense for Duhem is but a feature of the supple mind. It is not introduced 
all of a sudden as a new idea to just “save the (meta)phenomenon” of theory choice during 
underdetermination. It is a smooth and natural continuation of Duhem’s views on the mind of the 
theorist, which he articulates way before he comes to this problem of underdetermination, (in 
Chapter IV) in Aim and Structure.   
There is ample evidence for my view that Duhem took good sense as justifying theory 
choice. Duhem says we can “very properly decide” (1954, 217) between multiple theory choices 
using good sense. Further, he says good sense comes out so clearly “in favor of” (ibid., 218) one 
of the choices that the other side gives up the struggle (even though, he goes on to say, pure logic 
would not forbid its continuation) – again implying that we are compelled to accept its judgment 
even before future experiment can ratify the choice. He goes on to say regarding a good sense 
based judgment that a certain theory is to be discarded, “Pure logic is not the only rule for our 
judgments; certain opinions which do not fall under the hammer of contradiction are in any case 
perfectly unreasonable." (1954, 217) Also as in the German Science quote earlier, he says “Good 
sense will not return its verdict until after having weighed the pros and cons with mature 
consideration.” How do we understand such language? If an epistemic choice is proper, forceful, 
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reasonable, and based on mature consideration, I don’t see any reason we cannot properly 
construe it as being justified. 
What is the nature of this justification? It is reliabilist, as opposed to evidentialist. In 
particular, it is agent reliabilist. As in Section 3, agent reliabilism takes justification to be 
grounded in the cognitive character and successful and stable dispositions of the cognitive agent. 
This seems to apply very well to Duhem: theory choice according to him is grounded in and 
justified by good sense, an epistemic virtue: a stable and successful disposition that is part 
intuitive, part cultivated. Greco quotes Sosa in support of agent reliabilism, according to whom, 
just as in Virtue Ethics primary justification attaches to the virtues of the moral agent, and 
secondary justification to particular deeds based on those virtues, in VE, “primary justification 
would apply to intellectual virtues, to stable dispositions for belief acquisition, through their 
greater contribution toward getting us to the truth. Secondary justification would then attach to 
particular beliefs in virtue of their source in intellectual virtues or other such justified 
dispositions.” (Sosa quoted in Greco, 1999, 287) Along these same lines, what comes through in 
all those detailed characterizations of the different kinds of minds and “spirits” (‘espirit de 
finesse’ and ‘espirit de géométrie’) by Duhem is that primary justification (or the lack of it) 
attaches to the minds and associated virtues (or vices). Secondary justification attaches to 
decisions made based on those virtues: a certain theory is secondarily justified owing to its 
epistemic source – good sense – being primarily justified. Justification for good sense is for 
Duhem prior to the justification for theory choice: good sense is justified since it is just its nature 
to “weigh pros and cons with mature consideration” – and since theory choice comes out of it, it 
is in turn justified. 
What then is the role of evidence – here, novel predictive success? How does that fit into 
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this story? Duhem does in fact hail novel predictive success many times in Aim and Structure. 
He calls it the “highest test” (1954, 28) of holding a physical theory as approaching a natural 
classification. How to accommodate this in the agent reliabilist story? According to Ivanova, 
novel predictive success alone justifies theory choice for Duhem. According to Fairweather’s 
reading of Duhem, while good sense confers uniqueness on a theory and puts other contenders 
out of the running, only novel predictive success confers ‘fundamental epistemic standing’ on a 
theory. I will offer a textual interpretation of Duhem’s take on the role of novel predictive 
success in a bit, but before that a clarification is in order.  
Fundamentally, I think that there is no tension between giving an important epistemic 
consideration for novel predictive success on the one hand, and seeing good sense as an agent 
reliabilist virtue on the other. Recall Greco’s arguments: Apparent lining up with evidence alone 
cannot justify a belief since owing to Hume’s Problem of Induction we could never trust our 
evidence. We need some sort of reliabilism. Simple reliabilism won’t do owing to problems of a) 
the so-called fleeting processes, and b) subjective justification. Hence he argues, agent 
reliabilism is the way to go. However, will a false belief stemming from stable and successful 
dispositions count as knowledge according to agent reliabilism? For instance – taking the simple 
case of perceptual judgment – will the belief that a coiled rope is a snake count as knowledge? 
Greco doesn’t consider such cases explicitly but I think it is highly unlikely that he would 
consider such beliefs to be knowledge even if they stemmed from very reliable, i.e. stable and 
successful, dispositions in the most virtuous (conscientious, perspicacious etc.) agent. So over 
and above its source, a belief’s lining up with evidence would presumably be required for 
counting it as knowledge. As I read Greco, agent reliabilism’s focus seems to be on the point that 
apparent lining up with evidence is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge and justification. 
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(Or some might say it is probably sufficient for justification but certainly not for knowledge.) My 
point is, according an important epistemic role for evidence does not collapse agent reliabilism 
into evidentialism – it does not undermine it in any way. As long as we say that a person’s 
reliable epistemic virtues also play a necessary role in knowledge and justification, agent 
reliabilism is on firm ground. In the context of Duhem then, requiring a theory that is a product 
of good sense to make successful novel predictions doesn’t undermine an agent reliabilist 
reading of good sense; as long as it is clear that for Duhem, good sense is necessary to produce 
the theories. 
Now did Duhem in fact think good sense played a necessary role in theory choice? I 
believe he did. There is textual evidence for Duhem having taken good sense to be empirically 
necessary to produce theories that will tend to a natural classification. This should already have 
been clear from the quotes presented in the beginning of this section. But consider in addition the 
following revealing passage in German Science. Duhem tells us that good sense is not simply a 
capacity that comes into play during underdetermination: it enters the scene much earlier. Good 
sense directs the very construction of a theory, even before it is put to experimental test. Recall 
that for him the logical coordination and unity of theories is very important. And good sense is 
necessary for this: 
“In order to draw out of the preconceived idea consequences that can be compared with facts, 
which experimental proof will either confirm or condemn, one must deduce. Such deduction is 
often a quite long and delicate process. It is essential that it be a rigorous process, under pain of 
making the observational testing depend upon propositions which could not be derived from 
the hypothesis, and thus of rendering this testing illusory. This reasoning, however, cannot in 
general be conducted more geometrico, under the form of a series of theorems. The proposition 
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whose consequences one wishes to deduce would not lend itself to this process. The ideas on 
which it depends are no longer highly abstract but quite simple concepts, like the first objects 
of the mathematical sciences, or ideas made in a well-known fashion by definition using those 
concepts. These are ideas richer in content but less precise, less analysed; they issue more 
immediately from observations. To reason exactly with such ideas, the rules of syllogistic logic 
are not adequate. They must be assisted by a certain sense of soundness that is one of the forms 
of good sense.” (1991, 23) 
 Here I would like to quickly respond to Ivanova’s point that Duhem did not advance good 
sense as a method of science. She claims (2010, 62) that Duhem developed a deductive account 
of scientific method involving the following four steps: “‘(1) the definition and measurement of 
physical magnitudes; (2) the selection of hypotheses; (3) the mathematical development of the 
theory; (4) the comparison of the theory with experiment’ (ibid., p. 21).” (ibid., 62) She goes on 
to say that good sense does not determine the construction of a theory and does not justify it. 
But the above quote from German Science directly contradicts Ivanova’s point: Duhem did see 
good sense as a part of the scientific method – in fact, an important part of it. And he expressly 
denies that the scientific method is all deductive. Good sense is for him indeed necessary to 
construct and choose a theory. Just because Duhem’s account of good sense is thin as Ivanova 
rightly points out, the thinness does not in any way undermine the role of good sense in theory 
construction and choice. 
We should note here though that the kinds of necessity of reliability are different for 
reliabilism and Duhem’s picture. Given Hume’s Problem of Induction, the reliability of one’s 
source of belief is logically necessary if we want to avoid skepticism and want knowledge and 
justification to be possible. Reliabilism is premised on the idea that we do want to have 
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knowledge and justification and want to avoid skepticism. For Duhem, if natural classification is 
to be possible, good sense is empirically necessary to produce theories that will tend towards 
natural classification: it is a contingent fact of the physicist’s life that she needs to exercise good 
sense in order to produce theories that will tend towards natural classification. And for Duhem 
this is premised on the view that we do want natural classification and want to avoid the idea that 
our theories are mere instruments, just classifying empirical laws efficiently3. I present below 
this comparison between reliabilism and Duhem’s picture in a table. 
Table 1 
Epistemological Position (Agent) Reliabilism Duhemian Good Sense 
Ultimate requirement Possibility of knowledge and 
justification; avoidance of 
skepticism in order for us to 
feel at home in the world. 
To believe that theories tend 
toward a natural classification, 
and are not merely instruments 
classifying empirical laws – in 
order for the physicist’s life to 
be motivated and make 
pragmatic sense. 
Condition for satisfying above 
requirement 
Beliefs should stem from 
cognitive sources that reliably 
get us knowledge and 
justification. 
Theories should stem from 
good sense that reliably gets 
us closer to natural 
classification. 
Evidence required for belief/ 
theory to be completely 
justified and count as 
knowledge/ tending towards 
natural classification; over and 
above stemming from reliable 
cognitive sources  
Correspondence to the world: 
based on corroboration/ 
consensus/ validation… 
Novel predictive success. 
 
In other words, the motivation for (agent) reliabilism is to come up with a good epistemological 
story as to how knowledge is possible. Non-skeptics want knowledge. If we want knowledge, 
                                                
3 See Bhakthavatsalam (2015) for an argument for this view that Duhem valued the idea of 
natural classification since he thought it pragmatically benefitted the life of the physicist: it made 
her pursuit of physical theory meaningful, rational, and sensible. 
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reliabilism is logically necessary. Specifically, agent reliabilists take stable and successful 
dispositions of a cognitive agent to be necessary for producing justified beliefs. (Note that while 
reliability itself is logically necessary for knowledge to be possible as pointed above, this latter 
necessity of stable and successful dispositions isn’t logical: it is based on a need to rule out 
certain cases of belief formation like the case of fleeting processes as instances of producing 
knowledge.) Agent reliabilists believe theirs to be the correct story. In parallel, the motivation 
behind the concept of good sense is to come up with a good story as to how theory choice comes 
about. Duhem wants natural classification. And according to him good sense is empirically 
necessary for producing and choosing theories that will tend to a natural classification. And 
Duhem believes this to be the correct story about theory choice. 
There is one point of disconnect between (agent) reliabilism and Duhemian good sense 
that I briefly touched on above, but would like to elaborate on here. According to Greco if for 
instance a person reliably dreamed up right beliefs all or most of the time – not consciously 
exercising any epistemic virtues or dispositions – those beliefs wouldn’t count as knowledge. 
Hence clearly for him, epistemic virtues are a necessary part of justification since we don’t want 
to count such cases of lucky accidents as knowledge. But we are unable to make this exact 
parallel in the case of Duhem. In a situation where a physicist dreamed up theories (or chose 
theories in the face of underdetermination) that are logically unified and make successful novel 
predictions without the use of good sense; would Duhem consider such theories to be justified – 
i.e. approaching a natural classification? Given the empirical constraints of how our minds in fact 
function, without good sense, one cannot make the right choices. For instance the ample and 
weak minds that lacked good sense, are incapable of producing theories that will tend to a natural 
classification. But in the case of a hypothetical world with no such constraints where one 
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dreamed up the right choices, it isn’t clear from his writings what Duhem’s take would be. 
However, I’d like to point out that in the case of ordinary (say perceptual) judgment, there are 
relatively more solid means to confirm the truth of a belief independent of the cognitive source 
(like virtues) of the belief – by others’ testimonies, consensus etc. But in the case of a physical 
theory approaching natural classification, we don’t have ways of doing this. Duhem held that 
novel predictive success strengthened our intuition that a theory was approaching natural 
classification, but was no guarantee of it. So presumably for him over and above novel predictive 
success, being produced by good sense was necessary to further reinforce that intuition – for 
recall that for Duhem good sense not only picked out a theory during underdetermination, it also 
helped construct it in a logically unified way – and for Duhem this logical unity was another 
strong indication of approaching natural classification. 
Here is a last point before moving on to a closer reading of Duhem’s text on the role of 
novel predictive success. In addition to the argument from reliabilism, Fairweather (2011) 
advances another argument against Ivanova’s “deflation of good sense”: the position that good 
sense does not lend any epistemic strength or justification to the chosen theory. The argument is 
that if good sense were indeed merely explanatory and post hoc as Ivanova claims, and not 
justificatory, then we are free to imagine a case where good sense doesn’t intervene at all. After 
all, if good sense explains theory choice and there is no choice being made – i.e. if there’s no 
explanandum -  we don’t need an explanation. So let us suppose that we don’t make any choice 
in the face of a current “first level” underdetermination – i.e. a situation where multiple theories 
account for the current empirical facts equally well – and just wait for a future novel prediction 
to make a choice. This might not be the most efficient way to choose a theory, but let us assume 
we do this nevertheless – for according to Fairweather, Ivanova’s objection should imply the 
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possibility of this solution. Fairweather rightly points out that in this situation we might again 
end up with an underdetermination: what if all competing theories pass the novel prediction test 
as well? Therefore, Fairweather argues, good sense must play an important epistemic role above 
mere explanation, in the face of such a “second level” underdetermiantion. But he goes further 
than that and says that without it, we would never end up with a determinate choice, even with 
new confirming evidence.  
Fairweather is ignoring something here: the underdetermination could be transient, and 
future evidence could pick out a theory, however small the probability. The merit of good sense 
on my reading of Duhem does not lie in the inability of novel predictions to single out a theory. 
Even if future evidence clearly picks out one theory, this on my reading of Duhem, would be 
entirely independent of the role that good sense played in picking it out first. This is because as 
discussed above, novel predictive success is only an indicator of natural classification, not a 
guarantee of it: so it seems like for Duhem, being a product of good sense is an important 
ingredient in the belief that the product is approaching a natural classification. 
Now onto Duhem’s words on the role of novel predictive success: Why, as cited by 
Ivanova, does Duhem insist that despite good sense, it is a successful novel prediction that has 
the final word? Why does he repeatedly (Chapters II, IV, VI of Aim and Structure) say that 
experiment alone justifies adoption of a theory and that a physicist cannot be condemned on 
logical grounds if she chooses not to exercise her ‘espirit de finesse’ or chooses theories that are 
not logically unified and incompatible with each other (1954, 102)? For instance why does he, in 
the context of resolving underdetermination say in as many words that the methods of the 
physicist “are justifiable only by experiment”4? (217, emphasis mine.) I contend that throughout 
                                                
4 It is well known that Duhem problematized the relationship between theory and experiment: he 
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Aim and Structure, Duhem seems to have two distinct, non-intersecting epistemologies: one of 
physics – which seems evidentialist, and one outside of physics – which seems agent reliabilist. 
Duhem was a physicist-philosopher. He frequently claims that although there are absolutely no 
epistemic resources within physics for us to believe that physical theory latches on to a natural 
underlying order, we are forced to believe so by various factors outside of physics, logic and 
reason. It is worth noting that Duhem cites Pascal as saying that we sometimes believe for 
‘reasons that reason does not know’, both in the context of theories converging on to a natural 
classification as well as in that of good sense during underdetermination. About the former, he 
says: “The opinion is a legitimate one because it results from an innate feeling of ours which we 
cannot justify by purely logical considerations, but which we cannot stifle completely either.” 
(1954, 102) Further he says:  
“No language is precise enough and flexible enough to define and formulate them; and yet, 
the truths which this common sense reveals are so clear and so certain that we cannot either 
mistake them or cast doubt on them; furthermore, all scientific clarity and certainty are a 
reflection of the clarity and an extension of the certainty of these common-sense truths.” 
(1954, 104) 
 Duhem attributes similar patterns of thinking to good sense we well. For instance, as 
quoted earlier he says that good sense comes out “so clearly in favor of” (1954, 218) one of the 
multiple options in an underdetermination scenario. Given Duhem’s commitment to the moral 
                                                                                                                                                       
famously underlined the theory laden-ness of experiment, and that – as pointed out at the 
beginning of the paper – there is no ‘crucial’ experiment in physics; an isolated hypothesis can 
never be confirmed or disconfirmed by theory. While a theory is being constructed, single 
hypotheses cannot be tested. He however emphasized that once a theory is logically completed, 
its conclusions – but not its fundamental postulates and intermediary steps – have to hold up to 
experimental test: the “comparison between the conclusions of theory and the truths of 
experiment is… indispensible, since only the test of facts can give physical validity to a theory.” 
(1954, 206). While an isolated hypothesis could never be tested, it is nevertheless imperative for 
Duhem, to test the “whole of theory” with the “whole of experimental facts” (1954, 208) – while 
as I’m arguing here, operating within the domain of physics. 
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goodness and the intellectual acuity of the supple, strong and narrow minds, it is very unlikely 
that he thought that epistemic ends alone justify the means (here, successful novel prediction 
alone justifying that which chose the theory, i.e. good sense). It seems that for Duhem, theories 
that arise from good sense are justified from an agent reliabilist perspective. The justification 
Duhem talks about when he says that the methods of the physicist are justified by experiment 
alone – an apparently evidentialist view – should be considered when we are strictly within the 
confines of physics and its prescribed methods: here it is Duhem qua physicist speaking. But 
from a broader, philosophical perspective, Duhem rather means, I think, that while experiment 
further validates theory choice, as I’ve argued above, good sense is a necessary part of that 
choice. Based on all his discourse on the different kinds of minds, strongly praising some and 
reprimanding others, it seems clear that Duhem wants the physicist to be sensitive to the 
reliability of the source of her theories – and this idea is central to agent reliabilism. For Duhem 
the reasons for which the physicist chooses a theory are grounded in her good sense. However, 
the successful novel prediction will no doubt further vindicate the choice. In a sense then we 
might consider Duhem to have been a voluntarist about the role of the concepts of good sense 
and natural classification: when wearing the physicist hat, we have no reason to consider these 
ideas; but when we take a step back and look at the big picture – when we wear the philosopher’s 
hat if you will – we have no choice but buy into these ideas of natural classification and good 
sense.  
I contend then that good sense confers not just uniqueness, but actually does determine 
theory choice, also providing (an agent-reliabilist) justification. Good sense doesn’t simply pick 
one and put the rest “out of the running”. It is not just something that prevents the proliferation 
of acceptable theories. Good sense provides a sound epistemic basis for the uniqueness. With 
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this, I hope to have convinced the reader that no Fairweather-type hybrid reading of Duhem is 
required. Duhemian good sense fits quite comfortably into a purely agent reliabilist picture. 
 
5. The Problem of Induction: Duhemian Reliabilism vs. Popperian Falsification 
 I will conclude with some exploratory remarks on the value of reliabilism for a scientific 
realist position. Karl Popper (1959) famously held that science does not involve any induction. 
He thought that Hume was right about the Problem of Induction, but that science never faced it 
since it didn’t involve any induction. According to Popper, no finite evidence could ever suffice 
to warrant belief either that theories were true (or approached the truth), or that theories were 
(forever) empirically adequate. He thus believed that theories could only be tentatively accepted 
based on corroboration (as opposed to confirmation). A corroborated theory is one that has not 
yet been falsified. But of course, as many philosophers – notably Lakatos (1970), Kuhn (1962), 
and Putnam (1974) have pointed out, this is far from real scientific practice. In reality scientists 
hardly abandon a theory at first sign of falsification, in fact they even often adopt a falsified 
theory until a better alternative is available.  
 I think there might be an interesting resolution to the Problem of Induction in scientific 
practice to be found based on the foregoing arguments for an agent reliabilist reading of Duhem. 
Recall that reliabilism was advanced in response to the Problem of Induction, in order to avoid 
skepticism. In parallel, we could adopt a reliabilist position in the context of scientific practice, 
that could avoid us having to eschew any goals of truth in science. Yes, strictly speaking no 
amount of evidence suffices for us to have a positive epistemic attitude towards our theories, but 
as Samir Okasha (2002) notes, in reality scientists often do want to believe that their theories are 
progressively latching on to some truths. In a similar vein as noted earlier Duhem thought that 
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believing that physical theory approaches a natural classification, although does not hold water 
strictly within the confines of logic, has pragmatic benefits for the life of the physicist: it 
motivates her pursuit of physical theory and makes the pursuit sensible and rational. Within the 
strict confines of logic, nothing can reassure us that we are in fact reaching this goal. For Duhem, 
novel predictive success and logical coordination and unity of a theory “strengthens our 
intuition” that the theory is tending towards a natural classification, but is of course no guarantee. 
Hence if we assume that the mind of the physicist reliably produces theories that tend towards 
natural classification, it more strongly reinforces the belief that our theories do in fact tend 
towards natural classification. Duhem worked with the idea of natural classification rather than 
some grander version of truth, but one might extend this argument to support any kind of 
realism: a good reliabilist story about the production of scientific theories might be able to 
effectively get us out of the Problem of Induction in scientific practice5. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that a proper agent reliabilism accommodates Duhem as a virtue 
epistemologist very well and shows us that good sense does offer justification for theory choice. 
Importantly, I have shown that it is certainly not a post hoc explanation but a part and parcel of 
Duhem’s overall views on the mind of the physicist. Ivanova is mistaken in arguing that good 
sense does not provide justification. Fairweather’s hybrid reading is inadequate as well for it 
ignores the justification offered by a proper agent reliabilist reading of good sense. Finally, based 
on an agent reliabilist reading of Duhem, I explored the role that reliabilism in general could play 
                                                
5 Along somewhat similar lines Stathis Psillos (1999) discusses the reliability of Inference to the 
Best Explanation – and of ampliative reasoning in general – in support of the No Miracles 
Argument for scientific realism (although he makes no reference to agent reliabilism). 
 27 
in a defense of scientific realism. 
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